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CONFLICT OF LAWS

CONFLICT OF LAWS-Limitation on "Any Act" Within
the Scope of the Oklahoma Long Arm Statute
As a result of a 1945 Supreme Court decision, which
stimulated states to lengthen their reach for jurisdiction over
nonresidents, a number of so called "long arm" statutes were
enacted.
Generally, states have drafted their statutes to
achieve the maximum in personal jurisdiction within constitutional limits.2 To keep pace with the trend, Oklahoma
enacted in 1963 a deceptively simple, yet apparently allencompassing long arm statute. The statute derives its potential strength from the section which grants personal jurisdiction over a defendant for the commission of "any act"
within the State of Oklahoma.3
A Kentucky widow recently instituted and settled in
Oklahoma a wrongful death action arising out of an airplane accident which was fatal to her husband. In Ohio
Casualty Insurance Company v. First National Banc,4 the
airplane casualty insurer sought to assert a claim against the
widow's recovery in an action between it and the airplane
I International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

See, e.g., Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 342 F.2d 546, 552
(4th Cir. 1965); Haas v. Francher Furniture Co., 156 F.
Supp. 564, 567 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
3 OiLA. STAT. AN. tit. 12, § 187 (Supp. 1965):
(a) Any person, firm or corporation other than a
foreign insurer licensed to do business in the State
of Oklahoma who is a nonresident of this state and who
does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, whether
in person or through another, submits himself, and
if an individual his personal property, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause of action
arising from the doing of any of said acts: ...
(2) the commission of any act within this State ......
See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03 (Supp. 1965) (a
more recent statute setting out other bases of personal
jurisdiction).
4 425 P.2d 934 (Okla. 1967).
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mortgagee. In construing the "any act" language of the statute
for the first time, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
the widow's action did constitute an "act" within the meaning of the statute. In the suit between the insurer and the
mortgagee, however, the court refused to subject the widow
to the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma court on the grounds
that she did not have the requisite minimum contacts with
the state to satisfy the requirement of due process of law.5
In construing "any act" within the scope of the long arm
statute, the Oklahoma courts must rule on two issues: first,
whether the activity of the defendant constituted "any act"
within the framework of the long arm statute; and second,
whether the defendant came within the constitutional boundaries established by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.6 While the Ohio Casualty case was decided
primarily on the issue of due process, the case is significant
because of its treatment of the statutory language, "any act".
Justice Davison emphasized in Ohio Casualty that, although
it is possible to set various minimal criteria or standards,7 the
legislature furnished no description or words of limitation and
neither would the court. "For the purposes of this decision
we will assume that when [the Kentucky widow] filed and
prosecuted her lawsuit she engaged in the commission of an
act."8 By liberally interpreting what constituted "any act",
the court has refused to adopt a restrictive precedent as a
guideline for future determinations of the same type question.

5 But see Lodge v. Western N.Y. Dance Studio, 279 N.Y.S.2d

756 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (Fred Astaire allowed the use of his
name for a fee and, although he was never physically within the state, was found to have transacted business in the
state by his agency "alter ego").
6 U. S. CONST. amend. XIV,

§ 1.

7 See, e.g., Randle v. Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co.,

169 Ala. 314, 53 So. 918, 921 (1910)
affirmative action or performance).
8 425 P.2d at 939.

(an act denotes an
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The court subordinated that issue to the more important
discussion of due process.
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized
that certain minimum relations between the defendant and
the state must exist before the defendant can be subjected
to the jurisdiction of that state. More specifically, the due
process clause insures that an individual or corporate defendant who has had no contacts, ties, or relations with a
state will not be subject to a binding in personam judgment
in that state.9 The underlying basis of a state's right of exercise
jurisdiction over nonresidents and foreign corporations stems
from the fact that their activities invoke the benefits and protection of the laws of the state.10 Therefore, it is not a denial of
due process for a state to require a corporation to respond
to a suit brought to enforce obligations arising out of or
connected with the corporation's activities in that state."
By 1945 the evolution of theories rationalizing and explaining the basis of jurisdiction amounted to a succession
of mechanical, fictive principles.12 These principles included
personal service,13 consent,14 doing business,15 and presence.16
9 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945).

10 Id.
11 Id.

Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and
the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Ci.
L. REV. 569, 586 (1958).
13 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
14 See, e.g., Nierbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308
U.S. 170, 174 (1939); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold
Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 95 (1916); Simon
v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 116, 122 (1914).
15 See, e.g., Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 628 (1935);
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579
(1914); Superior Distrib. Corp. v. Hargrove, 312 P.2d 893,
897 (Okla. 1957).
16 Philadelphia & R. R.R. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 268 (1916).
12
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International Shoe Co. v. Washingtonl7 served to combine
the existing principles into a general test of reasonableness
in view of the defendant's activities. Mr. Chief Justice Stone
declared:
Due process requires only that in order to subject
a defendant to a judgment in personam,if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contracts with it such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."18
Professor Goodrich concluded that the decision in effect
synthesized the concepts of doing business and doing an act
for the purpose of determining jurisdiction.19 International
Shoe marked the first instance where the Court recognized
that acts in general or contacts were the legal base upon
which in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents was founded.
However, the type of act which might give rise to the minimum contact required for jurisdiction under a long arm statute
was left unanswered.
The Oklahoma statute is unique in establishing jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who commit "any act"
within the state. The closest parallel to the Oklahoma statute
is found in a Maryland statute2o which calls for corporate
liability for acts done within the state. This statute has
been interpreted to apply only to torts committed in the state
by a corporation which later withdraws from the state.21
Where the act is a tort, it has long been held that the performance of that single act could be sufficient contact with
the state to confer jurisdiction.22 A seemingly insignificant
17
18

326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Id. at 316 (footnotes omitted).

19 H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS
20 MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 92 (d)
21
22

216 (3rd ed. 1949).
(1957).

Rosenberg v. Andrew Weir Ins. Co., 154 F. Supp. 6, 9 (D.
Md. 1957).
See, e.g., Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935); Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1926).
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contact may also prove constitutionally adequate if it leads
to the cause of action involved in the particular suit.23 A
recent Maryland case24 went as far as any court has gone
in interpreting minimum contacts. The court ruled that
regular contacts with the forum state were not a prerequisite
to jurisdiction since each case depended upon its peculiar facts
and circumstances. In light of these decisions, the holding of
the Oklahoma Supreme Court in the Ohio Casualty case is
surprising. The maintenance of a single negligence action in
Oklahoma did not constitute sufficient minimum contact with
the state to subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of the
Oklahoma courts.5
The importance of the Ohio Casualty decision is twofold.
In addition to recognizing the familiar due process limitation
on state long arm statutes, the case preserves the potential
value of the Oklahoma long arm statute for a future plaintiff.
In refusing to restrict the general term "any act", the court
must have realized that if a state is to exercise the maximum
jurisdiction available over nonresidents, Oklahoma courts
must deal with the issue of due process unhampered by restrictive interpretations of the state long arm statute. In the
future, it appears that Oklahoma courts will face but one limitation-due process of law-in determining whether a nonresident defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of the state.
With the trend toward clarifying and delineating the scope
of the minimum contact doctrine, the only limits on in personam jurisdiction in Oklahoma are those inherent in the
fourteenth amendment.
Paul KMeinwachter

23
24

25

McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 342 F.2d 546, 550 (4th Cir.
1965). The contact of respondent with Maryland consisted of
its ship's six unscheduled visits to port in a nine-year period,
one visit giving rise to the libel in this case.
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 425 P.2d 934 (Okla.
1967).
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